The Core of Shapley-Scarf markets with couples
Küçük Resim Yok
Tarih
2011
Yazarlar
Dergi Başlığı
Dergi ISSN
Cilt Başlığı
Yayıncı
Elsevier Science Sa
Erişim Hakkı
info:eu-repo/semantics/closedAccess
Özet
We extend the Shapley-Scarf model of markets for indivisible goods without money to the case where couples of agents have joint preferences over the set of allocations. We show that the domain of (weakly) lexicographic preferences is maximal (for inclusion) for the existence of Core allocations. This result also holds in the case where the set of agents is partitioned into non-empty coalitions with any size, as well as for the class of markets studied in Konishi et al. (2001), where individuals exchange several types of purely indivisible goods. (C) 2010 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
Açıklama
Anahtar Kelimeler
Joint Preferences, Couples, Core, Indivisible Goods, Incentive Compatibility
Kaynak
Journal of Mathematical Economics
WoS Q Değeri
Q4
Scopus Q Değeri
Q2
Cilt
47
Sayı
1
