Choosers as extension axioms
Küçük Resim Yok
Tarih
2009
Yazarlar
Dergi Başlığı
Dergi ISSN
Cilt Başlığı
Yayıncı
Springer
Erişim Hakkı
info:eu-repo/semantics/closedAccess
Özet
We consider the extension of a (strict) preference over a set to its power set. Elements of the power set are non-resolute outcomes. The final outcome is determined by an (external) chooser which is a resolute choice function. The individual whose preference is under consideration confronts a set of resolute choice functions which reflects the possible behaviors of the chooser. Every such set naturally induces an extension axiom (i.e., a rule that determines how an individual with a given preference over alternatives is required to rank certain sets). Our model allows to revisit various extension axioms of the literature. Interestingly, the Gardenfors (1976) and Kelly (1977) principles are singled-out as the only two extension axioms compatible with the non-resolute outcome interpretation.
Açıklama
Anahtar Kelimeler
Preferences Over Sets, Non-Resolute Outcomes, Social Choice Functions, Strategy-Proof, Ordinal Probabilities, Decision Functions, Power Set, Manipulation, Alternatives, Preference, Rules
Kaynak
Theory and Decision
WoS Q Değeri
Q3
Scopus Q Değeri
Q2
Cilt
67
Sayı
4
