An individual manipulability of positional voting rules
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Dosyalar
Tarih
2011-12
Dergi Başlığı
Dergi ISSN
Cilt Başlığı
Yayıncı
Springer Heidelberg
Erişim Hakkı
info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
Özet
We study a problem of individual manipulation in an impartial culture (IC) framework using computer modeling. We estimate the degree of manipulability of ten positional voting rules in the case of multiple choice for 3 and 4 alternatives.
Açıklama
Anahtar Kelimeler
Manipulability, Positional voting rules, Multiple choice, Extended preferences
Kaynak
Series-journal of the spanish economic association
WoS Q Değeri
Q4
