When are committees of Condorcet winners Condorcet winning committees?

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dc.authoridDindar, Hayrullah/0000-0001-6724-2045|LAINE, Jean/0000-0002-7305-7556|Aslan, Fatma/0000-0003-1577-8109
dc.authorwosidDindar, Hayrullah/L-6020-2018
dc.contributor.authorAslan, Fatma
dc.contributor.authorDindar, Hayrullah
dc.contributor.authorLaine, Jean
dc.date.accessioned2024-07-18T20:40:37Z
dc.date.available2024-07-18T20:40:37Z
dc.date.issued2022
dc.departmentİstanbul Bilgi Üniversitesien_US
dc.description.abstractWe consider seat-posted (or designated-seat) committee elections, where disjoint sets of candidates compete for each seat. We assume that each voter has a collection of seat-wise strict rankings of candidates, which are extended to a strict ranking of committees by means of a preference extension. We investigate conditions upon preference extensions for which seat-wise Condorcet candidates, whenever all exist, form the Condorcet winner among committees. We characterize the domain of neutral preference extensions for which the committee of seat-wise winners is the Condorcet winning committee, first assuming the latter exists (Theorem 1) and then relaxing this assumption (Theorem 2). Neutrality means that preference extensions are not sensitive to the names of candidates. Moreover, we show that these two characterizations can be stated regardless of which preference level is considered as a premise.en_US
dc.description.sponsorshipBILGI Research Development Innovation Programme, POlarization viewed from SOcial choice Perspective (POSOP); TKP2020, National Challenges Program of the National Research Development and Innovation Office (BME NC TKP2020)en_US
dc.description.sponsorshipAuthors are grateful to two reviewers for their valuable comments and suggestions. This research has been partially funded by the BILGI Research Development Innovation Programme, POlarization viewed from SOcial choice Perspective (POSOP), and the TKP2020, National Challenges Program of the National Research Development and Innovation Office (BME NC TKP2020).en_US
dc.identifier.doi10.1007/s10058-021-00260-9
dc.identifier.endpage446en_US
dc.identifier.issn1434-4742
dc.identifier.issn1434-4750
dc.identifier.issue3en_US
dc.identifier.scopus2-s2.0-85114195002en_US
dc.identifier.scopusqualityQ2en_US
dc.identifier.startpage417en_US
dc.identifier.urihttps://doi.org/10.1007/s10058-021-00260-9
dc.identifier.urihttps://hdl.handle.net/11411/7145
dc.identifier.volume26en_US
dc.identifier.wosWOS:000692624900001en_US
dc.identifier.wosqualityQ4en_US
dc.indekslendigikaynakWeb of Scienceen_US
dc.indekslendigikaynakScopusen_US
dc.language.isoenen_US
dc.publisherSpringer Heidelbergen_US
dc.relation.ispartofReview of Economic Designen_US
dc.relation.publicationcategoryMakale - Uluslararası Hakemli Dergi - Kurum Öğretim Elemanıen_US
dc.rightsinfo:eu-repo/semantics/closedAccessen_US
dc.subjectCommittee Selectionen_US
dc.subjectCondorcet Choice Rulesen_US
dc.subjectSeparabilityen_US
dc.subjectPreference Extensionsen_US
dc.subjectLexicographic Propertyen_US
dc.subjectOstrogorski Paradoxen_US
dc.subjectScoring Rulesen_US
dc.subjectStable Rulesen_US
dc.subjectAlternativesen_US
dc.subjectConsistencyen_US
dc.subjectTheoremen_US
dc.titleWhen are committees of Condorcet winners Condorcet winning committees?en_US
dc.typeArticleen_US

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