Ensuring pareto optimality by referendum voting
dc.authorwosid | Sanver, M. Remzi/G-2339-2019 | |
dc.contributor.author | Ozkal-Sanver, Ipek | |
dc.contributor.author | Sanver, M. Remzi | |
dc.date.accessioned | 2024-07-18T20:40:27Z | |
dc.date.available | 2024-07-18T20:40:27Z | |
dc.date.issued | 2006 | |
dc.department | İstanbul Bilgi Üniversitesi | en_US |
dc.description | 7th International Meeting of the Society-for-Social-Choice-and-Welfare -- JUL 22-25, 2004 -- Osaka, JAPAN | en_US |
dc.description.abstract | We consider a society confronting the decision of accepting or rejecting a list of (at least two) proposals. Assuming separability of preferences, we show the impossibility of guaranteeing Pareto optimal outcomes through anonymous referendum voting, except in the case of an odd number of voters confronting precisely two proposals. In this special case, majority voting is the only anonymous social choice rule which guarantees Pareto optimal referendum outcomes. | en_US |
dc.description.sponsorship | Soc Social Choice & Welfare | en_US |
dc.identifier.doi | 10.1007/s00355-006-0101-7 | |
dc.identifier.endpage | 219 | en_US |
dc.identifier.issn | 0176-1714 | |
dc.identifier.issn | 1432-217X | |
dc.identifier.issue | 1 | en_US |
dc.identifier.scopus | 2-s2.0-33947616714 | en_US |
dc.identifier.scopusquality | Q1 | en_US |
dc.identifier.startpage | 211 | en_US |
dc.identifier.uri | https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-006-0101-7 | |
dc.identifier.uri | https://hdl.handle.net/11411/7117 | |
dc.identifier.volume | 27 | en_US |
dc.identifier.wos | WOS:000240438900014 | en_US |
dc.identifier.wosquality | Q4 | en_US |
dc.indekslendigikaynak | Web of Science | en_US |
dc.indekslendigikaynak | Scopus | en_US |
dc.language.iso | en | en_US |
dc.publisher | Springer | en_US |
dc.relation.ispartof | Social Choice and Welfare | en_US |
dc.relation.publicationcategory | Konferans Öğesi - Uluslararası - Kurum Öğretim Elemanı | en_US |
dc.rights | info:eu-repo/semantics/closedAccess | en_US |
dc.title | Ensuring pareto optimality by referendum voting | en_US |
dc.type | Conference Object | en_US |