Searching for a Compromise in Multiple Referendum

dc.authoridLAINE, Jean/0000-0002-7305-7556
dc.contributor.authorLaffond, Gilbert
dc.contributor.authorLaine, Jean
dc.date.accessioned2024-07-18T20:40:40Z
dc.date.available2024-07-18T20:40:40Z
dc.date.issued2012
dc.departmentİstanbul Bilgi Üniversitesien_US
dc.description.abstractWe consider a multiple referendum setting where voters cast approval ballots, in which they either approve or disapprove of each of finitely many dichotomous issues. A program is a set of socially approved issues. Assuming that individual preferences over programs are derived from ballots by means of the Hamming distance criterion, we consider two alternative notions of compromise. The majoritarian compromise is the set of all programs supported by the largest majority of voters at the minimum utility loss. A program is an approval compromise if it is supported by the highest number of voters at a utility loss at most half of the maximal achievable one. We investigate the conditions under which issue-wise majority voting allows for reaching each type of compromise. Finally, we argue that our results hold for many other preferences that are consistent with the observed ballots.en_US
dc.identifier.doi10.1007/s10726-010-9226-2
dc.identifier.endpage569en_US
dc.identifier.issn0926-2644
dc.identifier.issue4en_US
dc.identifier.scopus2-s2.0-84862169887en_US
dc.identifier.scopusqualityQ1en_US
dc.identifier.startpage551en_US
dc.identifier.urihttps://doi.org/10.1007/s10726-010-9226-2
dc.identifier.urihttps://hdl.handle.net/11411/7170
dc.identifier.volume21en_US
dc.identifier.wosWOS:000305129500007en_US
dc.identifier.wosqualityQ2en_US
dc.indekslendigikaynakWeb of Scienceen_US
dc.indekslendigikaynakScopusen_US
dc.language.isoenen_US
dc.publisherSpringeren_US
dc.relation.ispartofGroup Decision and Negotiationen_US
dc.relation.publicationcategoryMakale - Uluslararası Hakemli Dergi - Kurum Öğretim Elemanıen_US
dc.rightsinfo:eu-repo/semantics/closedAccessen_US
dc.subjectApproval Ballotingen_US
dc.subjectMajority Ruleen_US
dc.subjectMultiple Referendumen_US
dc.subjectVoting Paradoxen_US
dc.subjectCompromiseen_US
dc.subjectOstrogorski Paradoxen_US
dc.subjectSocial Choiceen_US
dc.subjectElecting Committeesen_US
dc.subjectAnscombe Paradoxen_US
dc.subjectApprovalen_US
dc.subjectMajorityen_US
dc.subjectRuleen_US
dc.titleSearching for a Compromise in Multiple Referendumen_US
dc.typeArticleen_US

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