Critical strategies under approval voting: Who gets ruled in and ruled out

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dc.authorwosidSanver, M. Remzi/G-2339-2019
dc.contributor.authorBrams, Steven J.
dc.contributor.authorSanver, M. Remzi
dc.date.accessioned2024-07-18T20:42:35Z
dc.date.available2024-07-18T20:42:35Z
dc.date.issued2006
dc.departmentİstanbul Bilgi Üniversitesien_US
dc.description.abstractWe introduce the notion of a critical strategy profile under approval voting (AV), which facilitates the identification of all possible outcomes that can occur under AV. Included among AV outcomes are those given by scoring rules, single transferable vote, the majoritarian compromise, Condorcet systems, and others as well. Under each of these systems, a Condorcet winner may be upset through manipulation by individual voters or coalitions of voters, whereas AV ensures the election of a Condorcet winner as a strong Nash equilibrium wherein voters use sincere strategies. To be sure, AV may also elect Condorcet losers and other lesser candidates, sometimes in equilibrium. This multiplicity of (equilibrium) outcomes is the product of a social-choice framework that is more general than the standard preference-based one. From a normative perspective, we argue that voter judgments about candidate acceptability should take precedence over the usual social-choice criteria, such as electing a Condorcet or Borda winner. (c) 2005 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.en_US
dc.identifier.doi10.1016/j.electstud.2005.05.007
dc.identifier.endpage305en_US
dc.identifier.issn0261-3794
dc.identifier.issn1873-6890
dc.identifier.issue2en_US
dc.identifier.scopus2-s2.0-33748941267en_US
dc.identifier.scopusqualityQ1en_US
dc.identifier.startpage287en_US
dc.identifier.urihttps://doi.org/10.1016/j.electstud.2005.05.007
dc.identifier.urihttps://hdl.handle.net/11411/7344
dc.identifier.volume25en_US
dc.identifier.wosWOS:000238813500005en_US
dc.identifier.wosqualityQ2en_US
dc.indekslendigikaynakWeb of Scienceen_US
dc.indekslendigikaynakScopusen_US
dc.language.isoenen_US
dc.publisherElsevier Sci Ltden_US
dc.relation.ispartofElectoral Studiesen_US
dc.relation.publicationcategoryMakale - Uluslararası Hakemli Dergi - Kurum Öğretim Elemanıen_US
dc.rightsinfo:eu-repo/semantics/closedAccessen_US
dc.subjectApproval Votingen_US
dc.subjectElectionsen_US
dc.subjectCondorcet Winner/Loseren_US
dc.subjectVoting Gamesen_US
dc.subjectNash Equilibriumen_US
dc.subjectUnmitigated Evilen_US
dc.titleCritical strategies under approval voting: Who gets ruled in and ruled outen_US
dc.typeArticleen_US

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