A general impossibility result on strategy-proof social choice hyperfunctions

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dc.authoridOzyurt, Selcuk/0000-0002-3326-5238;
dc.authorwosidOzyurt, Selcuk/AAF-8431-2020
dc.authorwosidSanver, M. Remzi/G-2339-2019
dc.contributor.authorOzyurt, Selcuk
dc.contributor.authorSanver, M. Remzi
dc.date.accessioned2024-07-18T20:42:43Z
dc.date.available2024-07-18T20:42:43Z
dc.date.issued2009
dc.departmentİstanbul Bilgi Üniversitesien_US
dc.description.abstractA social choice hyperfunction picks a non-empty set of alternatives at each admissible preference profile over sets of alternatives. We analyze the manipulability of social choice hyperfunctions. We identify a domain D-lambda of lexicographic orderings which exhibits an impossibility of the Gibbard-Satterthwaite type. Moreover, this impossibility is inherited by all well-known superdomains of D-lambda. As most of the standard extension axioms induce superdomains of D-lambda while social choice correspondences are particular social choice hyperfunctions, we are able to generalize many impossibility results in the literature. (C) 2008 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.en_US
dc.identifier.doi10.1016/j.geb.2008.09.026
dc.identifier.endpage892en_US
dc.identifier.issn0899-8256
dc.identifier.issn1090-2473
dc.identifier.issue2en_US
dc.identifier.scopus2-s2.0-67349157013en_US
dc.identifier.scopusqualityQ1en_US
dc.identifier.startpage880en_US
dc.identifier.urihttps://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2008.09.026
dc.identifier.urihttps://hdl.handle.net/11411/7376
dc.identifier.volume66en_US
dc.identifier.wosWOS:000267605300032en_US
dc.identifier.wosqualityQ2en_US
dc.indekslendigikaynakWeb of Scienceen_US
dc.indekslendigikaynakScopusen_US
dc.language.isoenen_US
dc.publisherAcademic Press Inc Elsevier Scienceen_US
dc.relation.ispartofGames and Economic Behavioren_US
dc.relation.publicationcategoryMakale - Uluslararası Hakemli Dergi - Kurum Öğretim Elemanıen_US
dc.rightsinfo:eu-repo/semantics/closedAccessen_US
dc.subjectStrategy-Proofnessen_US
dc.subjectManipulationen_US
dc.subjectGibbard-Satterthwaite Theoremen_US
dc.subjectSocial Choice Correspondencesen_US
dc.subjectHyperfunctionsen_US
dc.subjectManipulationen_US
dc.subjectCorrespondencesen_US
dc.titleA general impossibility result on strategy-proof social choice hyperfunctionsen_US
dc.typeArticleen_US

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