Manipulation of single-winner large elections by vote pairing
Küçük Resim Yok
Tarih
2017
Yazarlar
Dergi Başlığı
Dergi ISSN
Cilt Başlığı
Yayıncı
Elsevier Science Sa
Erişim Hakkı
info:eu-repo/semantics/closedAccess
Özet
Manipulation of indirect elections by vote pairing occurs when a group of voters in different electoral bodies secures a jointly preferred winner by performing pairwise exchanges of votes. We show that in elections involving a large enough number of districts, each with a large enough size, no reasonable constitution is immune to vote-pairing. (C) 2017 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
Açıklama
Anahtar Kelimeler
Representative Democracy, Vote Pairing, Group Manipulation
Kaynak
Economics Letters
WoS Q Değeri
Q4
Scopus Q Değeri
Q2
Cilt
161
