Manipulation of single-winner large elections by vote pairing

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dc.authoridDindar, Hayrullah/0000-0001-6724-2045|LAINE, Jean/0000-0002-7305-7556
dc.authorwosidDindar, Hayrullah/L-6020-2018
dc.contributor.authorDindar, Hayrullah
dc.contributor.authorLaine, Jean
dc.date.accessioned2024-07-18T20:42:33Z
dc.date.available2024-07-18T20:42:33Z
dc.date.issued2017
dc.departmentİstanbul Bilgi Üniversitesien_US
dc.description.abstractManipulation of indirect elections by vote pairing occurs when a group of voters in different electoral bodies secures a jointly preferred winner by performing pairwise exchanges of votes. We show that in elections involving a large enough number of districts, each with a large enough size, no reasonable constitution is immune to vote-pairing. (C) 2017 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.en_US
dc.identifier.doi10.1016/j.econlet.2017.09.040
dc.identifier.endpage107en_US
dc.identifier.issn0165-1765
dc.identifier.issn1873-7374
dc.identifier.scopus2-s2.0-85042150323en_US
dc.identifier.scopusqualityQ2en_US
dc.identifier.startpage105en_US
dc.identifier.urihttps://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2017.09.040
dc.identifier.urihttps://hdl.handle.net/11411/7328
dc.identifier.volume161en_US
dc.identifier.wosWOS:000417664400027en_US
dc.identifier.wosqualityQ4en_US
dc.indekslendigikaynakWeb of Scienceen_US
dc.indekslendigikaynakScopusen_US
dc.language.isoenen_US
dc.publisherElsevier Science Saen_US
dc.relation.ispartofEconomics Lettersen_US
dc.relation.publicationcategoryMakale - Uluslararası Hakemli Dergi - Kurum Öğretim Elemanıen_US
dc.rightsinfo:eu-repo/semantics/closedAccessen_US
dc.subjectRepresentative Democracyen_US
dc.subjectVote Pairingen_US
dc.subjectGroup Manipulationen_US
dc.titleManipulation of single-winner large elections by vote pairingen_US
dc.typeArticleen_US

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